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This paper investigates the effects of taxation on the distributions of income and wealth and 
on the welfare of heterogeneous households. I first demonstrate that the tails of income and 
wealth distributions converge to a Pareto distribution in a Bewley model in which 
households bear idiosyncratic investment shocks. This result extends the previous analysis in 
Nirei (2009). Thereafter, a non-distortionary tax and flat-rate taxes on capital income and 
consumption are introduced, and their impacts on aggregate wealth, the inequality index, 
households' welfare, and transition paths are quantitatively investigated. When the tax rate is 
set to generate the same GDP-government expenditure ratio, the model with capital tax 
generates smaller aggregate wealth and a smaller inequality index than the case with 
consumption tax or non-distortionary tax. 
 
Keywords: investment risk, Pareto distribution, Gini coefficient, and capital tax. 





                                                   
 I have benefitted from the comments received from Shuhei Aoki, Masaki Higurashi, and the 
seminar participants at RIETI. 
RIETI Discussion Papers Series aims at widely disseminating research results in the form of 
professional papers, thereby stimulating lively discussion. The views expressed in the papers are 
solely those of the author(s), and do not represent those of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade 
and Industry. 1 Introduction
Mechanisms underlying the distributions of income and wealth and the eects of tax
on the distributions have attracted renewed interests. Empirical studies by Feenberg
and Poterba [11] and Piketty and Saez [20] investigated the time series of top income
share in the U.S. by using tax returns data, and suggested that the tax reform play an
important role in determining inequality among households. Guvenen, Kuruscu, and
Ozkan [13] investigated the impact of tax on wage inequality. Cagetti and De Nardi
[6] studied the eect of estate tax on wealth inequality.
Along with the empirical studies, there has been a rapid development on the theo-
retical framework that accommodates the household heterogeneity and thereby income
and wealth inequality. For example, Numerical studies by Huggett [14] and Casta~ neda,
D az-Gim enez, and R os-Rull [9] successfully capture the overall shape of earnings and
wealth distributions in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Quadrini [21] and Cagetti
and De Nardi [6] match the wealth distribution in a rich model that explicitly formu-
lates entrepreneurs.
The present paper complements theirs by concentrating on the the tail distributions
of income and wealth, which covers a small fraction of population but has a large
impact on the inequality measures because of the tail's large shares in income and
wealth. This motivation is shared with Benhabib and Bisin [4] who investigated the
wealth distribution in an overlapping generations model.
In this paper, I extend my previous study [19] which developed a simple analytical
theory of income distribution in the Solow and Ramsey growth models. The previous
paper incorporated an idiosyncratic asset return shock, and showed that the Solow
model generates a stationary Pareto distribution for the detrended household income
at the balanced growth path. The paper analytically derived the Pareto exponent from
2fundamental parameters. The intuition for the Pareto distribution was analogous to
Gabaix [12]: the wealth accumulation follows a multiplicative process with a reective
lower bound in which wage income serves as the reective bound. The Pareto exponent
was determined by the balance of the savings from wage income that pushes up the
bottom of the wealth distribution and the inequalizing diusion eect that is attributed
to risk taking behaviors of the top wealth holders.
In the present paper, I show that the similar analysis applies to a Bewley model
with idiosyncratic investment shocks and borrowing constraints. Precautionary savings
due to the borrowing constraints and uninsurable shocks serve as the lower bound
of the wealth accumulation process. Using numerical computation, I show that the
model generates the Pareto distribution, and that the Pareto exponent is decreased
by a capital tax. Then, I introduce taxes on labor income and consumption as well,
and compare various taxation scheme that generate the same government expenditure-
GDP ratio. I nd that the capital tax generates a more egalitarian distribution than
consumption tax, whereas the eects of consumption tax are similar to that of non-
distortionary tax.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present a variation
of the Bewley model with idiosyncratic investment risks and borrowing constraints
and show the stationary distributions of income and wealth. I compare the result
to the same model without borrowing constraints, which generates a non-stationary
log-normal process for individual wealth. In Section 3, I introduce taxation other than
capital tax, compute the stationary equilibrium and compare the results across taxation
schemes. Section 4 concludes.
32 Quantitative demonstration of the Pareto distri-
bution
2.1 Bewley model with investment shocks and borrowing con-
straints
In this section, a Bewley model with idiosyncratic investment shocks and borrowing
constraints is presented. The model is a variation of Covas [10] with a pension program
and exogenous growth. Consider a continuum of innitely living households i 2 [0;1].
Each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor. Household i is also endowed






where li;t is the labor employed by i and ki;t is the capital owned by i. The labor-
augmenting productivity ai;t has a common trend  > 1:
ai;t = 
ti;t; (2)
where i;t is a temporary productivity shock. I assume that i;t follows a two-state
Markov process. The households do not have the means to insure against the produc-
tivity shock i;t except for their own savings.
Each household lineage is discontinued with a small probability  in each period.
At this event, a new household is formed at the same index i with no wealth. Following
the perpetual youth model [5], I assume that the households participate in a pension
program. The households contract all of the non-human wealth to be conscated by
the pension program at the discontinuation of the lineage, and they receive in return
4the premium in each period of continued lineage at rate p per unit of non-human wealth
they own. The pension program is a pure redistribution system, and must satisfy the
zero-prot condition: (1   )p = . Thus, the pension premium rate is determined as
p = =(1   ): (3)
The households can hold assets in the form of physical capital ki;t and bonds bi;t. The
bond bears a risk-free interest Rt. The households can engage in lending and borrowing
through bonds. There is a limit on the borrowing. I assume that the households can
borrow only up to a fraction  of their total wealth ki;t+bi;t. Capital income is taxed at
at-rate k. I assume that the tax proceeds are spent on the unproductive government
purchase of goods. In the following notation, consumption ci;t, assets ki;t and bi;t, and
real wage wt are detrended at the rate of technical progress .
In each period, a household maximizes its prot from physical capital i;t = yi;t  
wtli;t subject to the production function (1). Labor can be hired at wage wt, and the
labor contract is struck after the realization of the technology shock ai;t. The rst-order
condition of prot maximization yields the labor demand function:






Plugging into the production function, I obtain the goods supply function:






Then, I obtain i;t = yi;t and wtli;t = (1   )yi;t. At the optimal labor hiring li;t, the
return to capital is dened as
ri;t  i;t=ki;t + 1    = (1   )
(1 )=(ai;t=wt)
(1 )= + 1   : (6)
5Given the optimal operation of physical capital in each period, the households solve
the following dynamic programming:
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i > 0; (11)
where ~  is a modied discount factor ~   1 (1 ). Wi;t denotes the total resources
available to i at t (the cash-at-hand). The control variables ki and bi can be equivalently
expressed by i's total nancial assets xi  ki + bi and portfolio i  bi=xi. Thus, the
dynamic programming solves the optimal savings problem for xi and the portfolio
choice for i.
An equilibrium is dened as a value function V , policy functions (x;), price func-
tions (w;R), a joint distribution function , and the law of motion   for  such that
V (Wi;i;), x(Wi;i;), and (Wi;i;) solve the household's dynamic programming,
such that prices w() and R() clear the markets for labor
R 1
0 li;tdi = 1, goods, and
bonds
R 1
0 bi;tdi = 0, and such that the policy functions and the exogenous Markov pro-
cess of i constitutes   that maps the joint distribution of (Wi;i) to that in the next
period. A stationary equilibrium is dened as a particular equilibrium in which  is a
xed point of  .
With an autocorrelation in productivity i;t, the households with high productivity
will invest in capital with a high rate of borrowing, while the households with low
6productivity will shift their assets to risk-free bonds. Thus, as Covas [10] argued, this
model captures an economy in which a fraction of the households choose to become
entrepreneurs while the other households rely on wage and the returns from safe assets
as their main income source. Since the entrepreneurs bear the investment shocks
that generate the fat tail of wealth distribution in this model, I will observe that
the tail population largely consists of current and past entrepreneurs. As a model of
entrepreneurship, the model presented here is not as rich as the one with occupational
choice (see Quadrini [22] for a survey). Nonetheless, in this model, the entrepreneurs
(households with high productivity) do not diversify much of their investment risks
while workers choose to bear substantially smaller risks.
2.2 Borrowing constraints and Pareto distribution
I numerically solve for a stationary equilibrium of this economy. This model features a
multiplicative investment shock instead of an endowment shock that enters the wealth
accumulation process additively as in the benchmark model of Aiyagari [1]. Thus,
the stationary wealth distribution has a fat tail unlike in the Aiyagari economy. This
means that the simulation of wealth accumulation process suers a slow convergence
of aggregate wealth, due to the fact that the aggregated noise in a fat tail does not
decrease as quickly as the simulated population increases. However, if the wealth state
is discretized in logarithmic space, the stationary distribution can be computed well
simply by iterating the multiplication of the Markov transition matrix. Intuitively, this
is because the logarithm of a multiplicative process falls back to an additive process.
To manage the computation of portfolio choice, I follow a two-step approach similar
to Barillas and Fern andez-Villaverde [3], who solve the neoclassical growth model with
labor choice using the endogenous gridpoints method by Carroll [7] for the savings
7problem and the standard value function iteration for the labor choice. Further details
in the computation are deferred to Appendix A.
I compute the stationary equilibrium distributions of after-tax income and wealth
under tax rates k = 0:5 and k = 0:28. The tax rates are chosen to emulate the change
in the top marginal income tax rate in 1986 in the U.S., which is discussed in Section
3.3). The wealth corresponds to Wi;t and the after-tax income is wt + (1   k)((ri;t  
1)ki;t + (Rt   1)bi;t). The transition matrix  for the investment shock i is set by
11 = 0:9723 and 22 = 0:8, for which the stationary fraction of households with high
productivity is 12% and the average exit rate from the high productivity group is 20%.
These numbers correspond to the fraction and exit rate of the entrepreneurs in the
U.S. data (Kitao [15]). The states of the Markov process i;t are set at f0:95;1:05g.
The states are chosen so that the stationary wealth distribution in the model with tax
rate k = 0:5 has a Pareto exponent 2.2, which roughly matches with the U.S. level
right before the tax cut in 1986. The lineage discontinuation rate  is set at 1%. The
borrowing constraint  is set at 0.5. The parameters on technology and preferences are
set at standard values:  = 0:36,  = 0:1,  = 3,  = 0:96, and  = 1:02.
Figure 1 plots the distributions of income and wealth at stationary equilibrium for
k = 0:5 and 0.28. Pareto tails are clearly observed in both income and wealth dis-
tributions. The Pareto exponents for income and wealth coincide, since high income
earners earn most of the income from capital in this model. The Pareto tail is signi-
cantly atter in the low tax regime than in the high tax regime: 2.22 for k = 0:5 and
1.96 for k = 0:28. The simulations show that the Pareto distributions are obtained
in this model even when  = 0, i.e., the households live indenitely. I also compute a
transition path from the stationary distribution under k = 0:5 to that under k = 0:28.


















































Figure 1: Stationary distributions of income (left) and wealth (right) for capital tax
rates k = 0:5 and k = 0:28
9the tax cut is introduced.
2.3 Case without borrowing constraints
In this section, I analytically investigate the case without borrowing constraints. I
show that the wealth follows a log-normal process if there is no limit on borrowing,
no tax,  = 0, and if i;t is independent across t. This log-normal process implies
that no stationary distribution of relative wealth exists. When  > 0, the stationary
distribution of wealth has a Pareto tail, and the Pareto exponent is analytically derived.
Since this model features a utility exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, the
savings rate and portfolio decisions are independent of wealth levels if there is no limit
on borrowing (Samuelson [23], Merton [18]). Here I draw on Angeletos' [2] analysis of
a Bewley model with idiosyncratic investment risks. I set the capital tax to be zero:
k = 0. Let Ht denote the human wealth, dened as the expected discounted present











The evolution of the human wealth satises Ht = wt + (1   )R
 1
t+1Ht+1. We dene a
household's total wealth as
Wi;t = (1 + p)(ri;tki;t + Rtbi;t) + Ht: (13)
Note that the wage wt, human wealth Ht, and total wealth Wi;t are detrended by the
growth factor .
Consider a balanced growth path at which Rt, wt, and Ht are constant over time.
Then, the household's problem is formulated in a recursive form:

















i) + (1   )R
 1H; (15)
Wi = (1 + p)(riki + Rbi) + H: (16)
This dynamic programming allows the following solution with constants s and  (see
Appendix B for derivation):
c = (1   s)W; (17)
k
0 = sW; (18)
b
0 = (1   )sW   (1   )R
 1H: (19)
By substituting the policy functions in the denition of wealth (13), and by noting
that (1   )(1 + p) = 1 holds from the zero-prot condition for the pension program





~ gi;t+1Wi;t with prob. 1   
 H with prob. ;
(20)





i + (1   )R)s
1   
: (21)
Thus, at the balanced growth path, the household wealth evolves multiplicatively ac-
cording to (20) as long as the household lineage is continued. When the lineage is
discontinued, a new household with initial wealth Wi = H replaces the old one. There-
fore, the individual wealth Wi follows a log-normal process with random reset events
where H is the resetting point. Using the result of Manrubia and Zanette [17], the
Pareto exponent of the wealth distribution is determined as follows.
11Proposition 1 A household's detrended total wealth Wi;t has a stationary Pareto dis-
tribution with exponent  that is determined by
(1   )E(^ g

i;t) = 1 (22)
if  > 0. If  = 0, Wi;t has no stationary distribution and asymptotically follows a
log-normal distribution with diverging variance.
Proof: See Appendix C.
As seen in (22), the Pareto exponent is large when  is large. If there is no discon-
tinuation event (i.e.,  = 0), then the individual wealth follows a log-normal process
as in [2]. In that case, the relative wealth Wi;t=
R
Wj;tdj does not have a stationary
distribution. Eventually, a vanishingly small fraction of individuals possesses almost
all the wealth. This is not consistent with the empirical observations.
The log-normal process, and thus the diverging variance, do not occur in the model
with borrowing constraints even if  = 0. The dierence occurs from the fact that
the consumption function is nonlinear in wealth when there is a borrowing constraint
whereas it is linear without borrowing constraints. The linear consumption function
arises in a quite narrow specication of the Ramsey model as Carroll and Kimball [8]
argue. For example, a concave consumption function with respect to wealth arises
when the labor income is uncertain or when the household's borrowing is constrained.
This implies that the log-normal process of wealth is a special case whereas the Pareto
distribution characterizes a wide class of specications.
In sum, this section demonstrated that the Pareto distribution of income and wealth
naturally arises as a stationary distribution in the Bewley model with idiosyncratic in-
vestment shocks and borrowing constraints. I show that the precautionary savings that
arise from the borrowing constraints and the discontinuation of household lineage gen-
erate the stationary Pareto distribution, whereas without these two factors the model
12will generate a non-stationary log-normal development of wealth distribution. This
section also showed that the capital taxation reduces the stationary Pareto exponent.
A complete analysis of the eect of the savings on the Pareto exponent is provided in
a separate paper (Nirei [19]).
3 Eects of various taxation
3.1 Modied model with consumption, capital, and labor taxes
In the last section, I conducted an experiment of a tax cut in an environment where the
government expenditure is passively determined by the tax proceeds. In this section,
I x the government expenditure as a fraction of GDP, and the tax rate is determined
so that the tax proceeds in a stationary equilibrium meets the required government
expenditure. By this way, I can compare the eects of various taxation schemes given
the constraint that the government must nance an exogenously xed expenditure-
GDP ratio.
I modify the budget constraints of the household at the balanced growth path as
follows:



















i > 0 (26)
where l, k, and c denote at tax rates on labor income, capital income, and consump-
tion, respectively. Note that the labor tax is non-distortionary, since labor is supplied
inelastically in this model.
13The exogenous ratio of government expenditure to GDP is denoted by  g. The





ci + k(riki + Rbi)di + lw (27)
The stationary equilibrium is dened similarly to that in the previous section, with
an addition of the government budget constraint. The stationary equilibrium is solved
numerically with the algorithm similar to that in the previous section. One dierence
is that I use simulations here rather than the multiplication of transition matrix to
compute the stationary distribution of wealth.
3.2 Numerical results
The parameter values are set as follows. The investment shock has two states, i;t 2
f0:85;1:15g. These values are chosen so that the Pareto exponent of the simulated
income distribution falls in the empirical range. The transition matrix for ai;t is set
so that Pr(i;t = 1:15 j i;t 1 = 1:15) = 0:95 and Pr(i;t = 0:85 j i;t 1 = 0:85) = 0:5.
This transition probability is chosen so that at the stationary distribution 10% of the
households have a high shock. The government expenditure is set at g = 0:1 of GDP.
Tax rates for labor income, capital income, or consumption are set so that each tax
scheme raises the tax proceeds equal to the government expenditure. The government
expenditure is assumed unproductive. Other parameters are the same as in the previous
section:  = 0:36,  = 0:1,  = 3,  = 0:96,  = 1:02, and  = 0:01. For the
computation, the resource available to the households (the cash-at-hand) is discretized
by 100 grids which are equally spaced in logarithmic scale, and a population of 100,000
households are simulated.
Figure 2 plots the policy functions for savings (wealth next period) for the house-






























































Figure 2: Optimal savings k0
i + b0
i as a function of Wi for the households with a low
shock (left) and a high shock (right)
holds with a low shock and a high shock. We observe that the functions are almost
linear except for around the lower bound of wealth. The households with high shocks
consume more than those with low shocks. The households save more under the capital
tax regime than other tax regimes.
Figure 3 plots the policy functions for portfolio (the risk-free bond's share of total
wealth) for the households with a low and a high shock. The households with low
shocks tend to hold wealth in the form of risk-free bond, while the households with
high shocks always borrow through bonds. The portfolio of the households with high
wealth and low shocks converges to a constant, which is consistent with the implication
of the Ramsey model without borrowing constraints. When the households are far
from the borrowing constraint point, their behavior becomes similar to that without
borrowing constraints. The households near the lower bound of wealth tend to choose
risky portfolio.





































































Figure 3: Optimal portfolio b0
i=(k0
i + b0
i) as a function of Wi for the households with a
low shock (left) and a high shock (right)
Figure 4 plots the value functions for the households with a low and a high shock
under various tax schemes. It is observed that the labor income tax achieves a higher
value for each wealth level than the capital income tax and consumption tax. This is
because the labor income tax in our model is equivalent to lump-sum tax, since labor
is supplied inelastically, and thus the labor tax is non distortionary. I observe that the
value functions under capital income tax and consumption tax do not dier very much.
Figure 5 plots the cumulative distribution of wealth across households in log-log
scale. Pareto distributions are observed in the tail. Pareto exponent is clearly higher
under the capital income tax scheme than under the labor income tax or the consump-
tion tax. This is because the capital income tax reduces the variance of the after-tax
rate of return to capital. In addition to the direct eect of tax on the after-tax rate
of return, households shift their wealth from risky assets to risk-free asset as shown
in Figure 3, because the reduced variance of after-tax rate decreases the contribution








































Figure 4: Value functions for the households with a low shock (left) and a high shock
(right)
of diusion eects to the asset growth. Hence, the capital tax lowers the households'
risk-taking and results in the steepened tail distribution of wealth.
Table 1 shows the aggregate quantities and prices under various tax schemes. It is
clear that the capital taxation generates lower capital, output, consumption, and wage.
The after-tax return on capital is equilibrated across tax schemes, because the Euler
equation dictates the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution to be equal to the
after-tax return. The consumption tax produces almost the same outcome as the labor
(non-distortionary) tax. This results conrm the similar results known in homogeneous
agent models.
Table 2 shows the median household's status and the overall inequality measures.
The median of x (the wealth available in a period), k (the physical capital), consump-
tion, and value v are reported. The Gini coecient is computed for wealth x. The


















































Figure 5: Simulated stationary distributions of wealth
K Y C R-1 r(1)-1 r(2)-1 w
l = 0:16 2.32 1.39 0.88 0.105 0.099 0.24 0.76
c = 0:15 2.34 1.41 0.87 0.104 0.098 0.24 0.76
k = 0:47 1.32 1.13 0.75 0.200 0.193 0.61 0.40
Table 1: Simulation results on aggregate quantities and prices
18med x med k med c med v Gini Pareto
l = 0:16 1.88 1.11 0.72 -7.19 0.57 1.84
c = 0:15 2.05 1.16 0.72 -6.99 0.58 1.90
k = 0:47 1.51 0.80 0.65 -9.72 0.46 2.58
Table 2: Simulation results on median household and inequality indices
serve that the median consumption and welfare value is lower under the capital tax.
The inequality measures decrease under the capital tax. This is consistent with previ-
ous results in this paper. The capital tax steepens the slope of the tail distribution, i.e.
increases the Pareto exponent. Even though the capital tax also lowers the wage rate,
the equalization of the wealth dominates the eect and the overall inequality measure,
i.e. the Gini coecient, goes down.
Finally, I conduct a welfare comparison. I consider a household with wealth x.
The value for this household located in the stationary economy under capital tax is
denoted by Vcapital(x), while that under consumption tax is Vconsumption(x). I dene a
compensated wealth (x) as:
Vcapital((1 + )x) = Vconsumption(x) (28)
Namely, the household with x is indierent between the two economies if  fraction of
wealth x is compensated for living under the capital tax regime.
Figure 6 plots the compensation  as a function of percentile in wealth x and a
productivity shock status. I observe that the capital tax is preferred by almost all
the households with high shocks and 90 percent of the households with low shocks.
This implies that, in this model, the benets of the high wage and high returns to
capital outweigh the cost of consumption tax for most of the households, except for

















Figure 6: Compensated wealth  for the relocation from the consumption tax economy
to the capital tax economy for a household with a relative wealth shown in the percentile
of x
20the households with low shocks and high wealth. This is intuitive: the households with
low shocks and high wealth nance their high consumption by dissaving, and thus the
benet of high wage and returns is outweighed by the high cost of consumption.
3.3 Transition eects of a tax cut
Taxation has a direct eect on wealth accumulation by lowering the after-tax increment
of wealth and the eect through the altered incentives that the households face. The
impact of income tax legislation in the 1980s in the U.S. has been extensively discussed
in the context of the recent U.S. inequalization. As studied by Feenberg and Poterba
[11], an unprecedented decline in the Pareto exponent occurred right after the Tax
Reform Act in 1986. Although the stable exponent after the downward leap suggests
that the sudden decline was partly due to the tax-saving behavior, the steady decline
of the Pareto exponent in the 1990s may suggest more persistent eects of the tax
act. Piketty and Saez [20] suggests that the imposition of progressive tax around the
Second World War was the possible cause for the top income share to decline during
this period and stay at its low level for a long time until the 1980s.
The simulated results shown in Figure 1 and the above analytical results conrm
that the tax cut that aects capital income reduces the Pareto exponent. However,
the simulations of the transition path from k = 0:5 to 0.28 show that the transition
in the slope of the tail takes a very long time while the mean of income and wealth
converges relatively fast. Given a tax cut, the households choose to consume more
in the present, and thus their accumulation of wealth becomes slower than what the
Solow model predicts as in [19]. This postponement eect is greater for the households
with higher wealth.

















































Figure 7: Transition path from the stationary equilibrium with k = 0:5 to that with
k = 0:28



















Figure 8: Transition paths from the stationary equilibrium with k = 0:5 to that with
k = 0:28
bution of wealth is faster for the low-wealth group than the high-wealth group. Thus,
even though the aggregate capital adjusts toward its new level steadily (as shown in
Figure 8), the eect on slope takes much longer. This is an important departure from
the Solow model.
The transition path in the simulated model is consistent with the fact that the top
share of income has increased after the tax cut [20], since the aggregate capital and the
top income shares converge to a new stationary level relatively quickly. However, it is
not consistent with the observation that the Pareto exponent has also decreased in the
years after the cut. One possible explanation is that the Pareto exponent I estimated
at the top 1 percentile of income [19] does not correspond to the Pareto exponent I
23observe at the very end of our computed distribution. In Figure 1, I observe that the
slope at the 1 percentile is steeper than the slope further at the tail. This is because
the contribution of wage income is non-negligible for this level of income.
3.4 Eects of riskiness
Finally, I explore an alternative explanation for the U.S. historical experience. The
Pareto exponent has experienced a large change in drift around 1970s in the U.S. It
has been recognized that the income distribution has become inegalitarian since 1980s
([20], [24]), and it has come to much public notice. The attened tail constitutes an
important part of this inequalization process. Our model (as in [19]) identies several
fundamental parameters as the determinant of the Pareto exponent. Let us focus on
the key variable, (z= x)=(Var(g)=2), that measures the ratio between the contributions
of the savings from labor income and of the diusion eect. The numerator can be
decomposed into the personal savings rate, the labor share of income, and the output-
capital ratio. The latter two factors are fairly stable, while the personal savings rate
shows a steady decline in these years. Figure 9 plots the historical personal savings
rate in the NIPA statistics. The denominator, the variance of the asset growth rate for
individuals, is hard to measure. Figure 9 plots the time series of the annual excess re-
turns of the S&P500 index relative to the treasury bills (smoothened by 7-year moving
average). The plotted excess returns measure our Var(g)=2 under the assumptions that
the individual wealth experiences the same volatility as the S&P500 index, and that
the mean of the logarithmic instantaneous returns coincide between the S&P500 index
and the Treasury Bills. Under the assumptions, the logarithm of the annual return of
the S&P500 is equal to the returns on the treasury bills plus a half of the logarithmic
variance of the S&P500 returns. I note that the excess returns experienced a marked













Figure 9: Excess returns measured by S&P500 index returns minus T-Bills returns
(left axis) and the personal savings rate (right axis). The excess returns are smoothed
by 7-year moving average.




























Figure 10: U.S. Pareto exponent (estimated in the range of the 99 percentile to the
99.9 percentile income) and the model prediction when the excess returns of S&P500
index is used as the proxy for Var(g)/2.
trough around 1970. Figure 10 shows the model prediction when the excess return
is used for Var(g)=2 and when the NIPA personal savings rate is used to compute z
in our formula for  [19]. The time series of the labor share is computed from the
NIPA statistics and the capital-output ratio is xed at the historically stable value,
2 (Maddison [16]). The predicted Pareto exponent is mostly too small to match the
estimated exponent, possibly due to the underestimation of the contribution from the
savings and due to the overestimation of the wealth growth variance. Also, the pre-
dicted exponent becomes extremely large or negative around 1970, due to the near-zero
or negative values of the excess returns of S&P500 index during the periods. However,
the movement of the predicted series is remarkably parallel to the actual series.
264 Conclusion
This paper demonstrated that the Bewley model with idiosyncratic investment shocks
is able to generate the Pareto distribution as the stationary distribution of income
at the balanced growth path. I argued that the Pareto distribution is generated by
the investment shock that provides a multiplicative shock in the wealth accumulation
process and by the borrowing constraints that induce precautionary savings and work
as a reective lower bound of the wealth accumulation. I showed that the capital tax
reduces the Pareto exponent. The Pareto exponent was also analytically determined
by fundamental parameters for a particular case.
I compared the distributions of income and wealth across dierent tax schemes that
generate the same government expenditure-GDP ratio. Under calibrated parameter
values, the simulation shows that the Pareto exponent is lower under capital tax than
under consumption tax, while the exponent under consumption tax is similar to that
under non distortionary tax. I also conducted a welfare comparison between the capital
and consumption taxes. The result showed that a small fraction of the households with
low shocks and high wealth prefers the stationary equilibrium under the consumption
tax while others showed the opposite preference.
Appendix
A Computation
In this section I explain the numerical computation of the model in Section 2.2. A
household's cash-at-hand Wi is discretized by 100 grids that are equally spaced in
logarithmic scale. The pseudo code for the stationary equilibrium is as follows.
271. Outer loop: Set nt = 0 and guess values for 0(Wi;i)
(a) Inner loop 1: Set nk = 0 and guess values for x0(Wi;i) and aggregate capital
K0
i. Compute wnk and rnk
ii. Solve for the value function Vnk and the savings function xnk by the
endogenous gridpoints method, under xed nt
iii. Construct a transition matrix  nk for (Wi;i) by xnk, nt, and the tran-
sition matrix for i
iv. Compute a stationary distribution nk(Wi;i) by iterating the transition
matrix  nk
v. Compute aggregate capital Knk+1 by the stationary distribution nk
and nt.
vi. If jKnk+1   Knkj > K, reset nk to nk + 1 and go to (i). Otherwise, go
out of the loop.
(b) Inner loop 2: Set nb = 0 and guess a value for risk-free rate R0
i. Compute the portfolio function nt+1 by solving the rst order condition,
under xed xnk
ii. Compute aggregate bond demand Bnb by nk and nb
iii. If jBnbj > B, reset nb to nb + 1, update Rnb and go to (i). Otherwise,
go out of the loop.
2. If supjnt+1(Wi;i) nt(Wi;)j > , reset nt to nt+1 and go to 1(a). Otherwise,
exit the algorithm.
28To compute a transition path from k = 0:5 to k = 0:28, rst I compute the
stationary equilibria for both taxes. I set the transition period T suciently long (1,000
in this computation). I set the policy functions at T to be equal to the stationary policy
functions under k = 0:28. Then, I guess a transition path of (Kt;Rt;t(Wi;i)) for
which K0 and KT are set to the aggregate capital at the stationary equilibrium under
k = 0:5 and k = 0:28, respectively. By using the value function at the end point
and the guessed path of (Kt;Rt;t), I solve backward for the savings function xt for
t = 0;1;:::;T   1. Then, applying the policy functions successively forward to the
initial distribution 0 which is equal to the stationary distribution under k = 0:5, I
obtain the transition path of t. Using the path of t and t, I compute the path of Kt
and compare it to the old path of Kt. If the two paths deviate suciently, I go back
and solve backward the savings functions. If the two paths converge, then I compute
the optimal portfolio t and the market-clearing risk free rate Rt for each t. Then, I
update the path of (Rt;t) and go back to the beginning of the outer loop. I exit the
outer loop when the paths (Rt;t) converge.
In order to compute the stationary equilibrium when a tax rate is determined so
that it can nance a xed government expenditure-GDP ratio, I make a guess for the
tax rate 0 along with the risk-free rate R0 at 1(b): Inner loop 2. Then, at 1(b)(iii),
I add a convergence criterion for the government budget constraint along with the
market clearing condition for bonds.
29B Derivation of the policy function in the Ramsey
model
First, I guess and verify the policy functions (17,18,19) at the balanced growth path
along with a guess on the value function V (W) = BW 1 =(1 ). The guessed policy
functions for c;k0;b0 are consistent with the budget constraint (15).
The rst-order conditions and the envelope condition for the Bellman equation (14)
are:
c











Note that we used the condition (1   )(1 + p) = 1 from (3). By imposing the guess
on these conditions, and by using W 0 = (r0 +(1 )R)(1+p)sW from (20), I obtain
the equations that determine the constants:
0 = E[(r
0   R)(r
0 + (1   )R)
 ]; (32)








B = (1   s)
 : (34)
Thus the guess is veried.
C Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, I solve the Ramsey model and show the existence of the balanced growth
path. Then the proposition obtains directly by applying Manrubia and Zanette [17].
30To be compatible with the notation in [19], I dene Xt = Kt=t as detrended








 1 + 1   ; (35)
which is a stationary process. The average return is:
 r  E(r) =   X
 1 + 1   : (36)
The lending market must clear in each period, which requires
R
bi;tdi = 0 for any
t. By aggregating the non-human wealth and using the market clearing condition for
lending, I obtain:
R
Fi;tdi =  rKt. Thus the aggregate total wealth satises
R
Wi;tdi =
(1   ) 1 rKt + Ht. At the balanced growth path, aggregate total wealth, non-human
wealth and human wealth grow at rate . Let  W,  H, and  w denote the aggregate total
wealth, the human capital and the wage rate detrended by t at the balanced growth
path, respectively. Then I have:
 W = (1   )
 1 r  X +  H: (37)
Combining the market clearing condition for lending with the policy function for lend-







By using the conditions above and substituting the policy function (17), the budget
constraint (15) becomes in aggregation:
(   s(1   )
 1 r)  X = (s   (1   )R
 1)  H: (39)








31Thus, the mean return to the risky asset and the risk-free rate are determined by  X
from (36,40). The expected excess return is solved as:





 1 + 1      (1   )=s

: (41)
If log  N( 2=2;2), then I have  = e
2
2 (1 )(1= 2). This shows a relation between
the expected excess return and the shock variance 2.
Then, the human wealth is written as:

















1   (1   )R 1 =
(1   )  X
1   (1   )R 1:
(42)
Equations (36,39,40,42) determine  X;  H;R;  r. In what follows, I show the existence
of the balanced growth path in the situation when the parameters of the optimal policy







(1   )  X 1 : (43)
The right hand side function is continuous and strictly increasing in  X, and travels
from 0 to +1 as  X increases from 0 to +1.
Now, the right hand side of (39) is transformed as follows:
 H(s   (1   )R
 1) =  H
 






1   (1   )
 
(1   )






   (1   )(1   )









= 1 + (1   )
 1 r  X
 H
: (45)
By (36),  r is strictly decreasing in  X, and R is strictly increasing by (40). Thus  W=  H
is strictly decreasing by (38), and so is  r  X=  H by (37). Thus, the right hand side of (45)
32is positive and strictly decreasing in  X. The left hand side is monotonically increasing
from 0 to +1. Hence there exists the steady-state solution  X uniquely. This veries
the unique existence of the balanced growth path.
The law of motion (20) for the detrended individual total wealth xi;t is now com-





~ gi;t+1xi;t with prob. 1   
 H with prob. ;
(46)
where,
~ gi;t+1  (ri;t+1 + (1   )R)s=((1   )): (47)
This is the stochastic multiplicative process with reset events studied by Manrubia and
Zanette [17]. By applying their result, I obtain the proposition.
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